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Abstract
Background: Mimicry, in which one prey species (the Mimic) imitates the aposematic signals of another prey (the Model) to
deceive their predators, has attracted the general interest of evolutionary biologists. Predator psychology, especially how
the predator learns and forgets, has recently been recognized as an important factor in a predator–prey system. This idea is
supported by both theoretical and experimental evidence, but is also the source of a good deal of controversy because of
its novel prediction that in a Model/Mimic relationship even a moderately unpalatable Mimic increases the risk of the Model
(quasi-Batesian mimicry).
Methodology/Principal Findings: We developed a psychology-based Monte Carlo model simulation of mimicry that
incorporates a ‘‘Pavlovian’’ predator that practices an optimal foraging strategy, and examined how various ecological and
psychological factors affect the relationships between a Model prey species and its Mimic. The behavior of the predator in
our model is consistent with that reported by experimental studies, but our simulation’s predictions differed markedly from
those of previous models of mimicry because a more abundant Mimic did not increase the predation risk of the Model
when alternative prey were abundant. Moreover, a quasi-Batesian relationship emerges only when no or very few
alternative prey items were available. Therefore, the availability of alternative prey rather than the precise method of
predator learning critically determines the relationship between Model and Mimic. Moreover, the predation risk to the
Model and Mimic is determined by the absolute density of the Model rather than by its density relative to that of the Mimic.
Conclusions/Significance: Although these predictions are counterintuitive, they can explain various kinds of data that have
been offered in support of competitive theories. Our model results suggest that to understand mimicry in nature it is
important to consider the likely presence of alternative prey and the possibility that predation pressure is not constant.
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Introduction
Ever since the phenomenon of mimicry was first described [1,2],
it has drawn a great deal of attention, and it has been intensively
studied as an example of Darwinian (co)evolution [3–8]. In
Batesian mimicry, a palatable species (the Mimic) benefits from its
resemblance to an unpalatable species (the Model), whose
aposematic signal is therefore degraded in time; in this way, it is
a parasitic relationship [1,5,8]. Mu ¨llerian mimicry involves two or
more sympatric aposematic species, known as co-Mimics, that
share the same or a similar warning pattern [2,5,8]. All of the
unpalatable co-Mimic species benefit because they share the
mortality costs of the predator learning process [2, reprinted in 9].
Many studies have suggested that the evolutionary consequences
of these two types of mimicry are distinct [5,8,10,11]. In Batesian
mimicry, a more abundant Mimic is expected to increase the
predator attack rate on the Mimic as well as on the Model
(negative frequency-dependent selection) and promote polymor-
phism in the Mimic, because an increase in the number of a
certain type of Mimic is expected to decrease the fitness of that
mimic [6,10,11]. In contrast, in Mu ¨llerian mimicry, the existence
of co-Mimics is expected to reduce the per capita attack rate on
both species, leading to number- or frequency-dependent selection
and promoting monomorphism in the co-Mimics [6,10,11].
However, in some well-known examples of Mu ¨llerian mimicry,
the co-Mimics are spectacularly polymorphic [12].
Huheey [13–15] proposed a mathematical model that chal-
lenged this classical Batesian–Mu ¨llerian dichotomy. Called the
encounter-memory approach [8], the model assumes extraordi-
narily simple behavior on the part of the predator: the predator
avoids both Models and Mimics following the attack on the
Model, for subsequent n21 encounters the number of which (=n)
positively correlates with the Model’s unpalatability [13]. The
model still yields results that agree very well with the experimental
evidence [14 for a review]. However, the model has generated
fierce criticism [16,17] because of its radical prediction that
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model predicts that a less-defended co-Mimics always increases the
attack probability on a more-defended co-Mimic and that the
relationship can be neutral at best, when the unpalatability of the
co-Mimics is identical [15]. The main cause of this counter
intuitive prediction was claimed to be the encounter-based
memory parameter of a predator: memories of a predator must
change in a time-dependent manner [16,17].
Speed [18] developed a time-based Monte Carlo predator model
that incorporated psychology-based rules to describe learning,
memory, and motivation of predators [19] to analyze the effects of
the behavior and experience of an individual ‘‘Pavlovian’’ predator
on the probability that it would attack a prey item. This succeeded
in ‘rescuing’ mutualistic Mu ¨llerian mimicry: when both Mu ¨llerian
co-Mimics are almost equally well defended, their relationship is
mutualistic. In contrast to classical Mu ¨llerian mimicry, however, if
one co-Mimic is less well defended then the protection of the better-
defended one is diluted. This type of mimicry is called quasi-
Batesian [18,20] because even though both species are defended,
the weakly defended species exploits the better-defended one in a
parasitic, Batesian manner [18,20]. Support has been growing for
this approach, because a quasi-Batesian relationship can explain the
observed polymorphism of co-Mimics in nature [2,18 cf. 7, 21].
However, this quasi-Batesian relationship, where even a defended
Mimic raises the predation risk of its Model, would seem
counterintuitive, and the prediction has stirred new controversy as
to whether it really occurs in nature [7,9,21].
The primary difference between the classical view of mimicry
[2,7,9,21] and the more recent challenges to this classical view
[18,20,22,23] is how they define unpalatability. In the former, a
prey species always reduces its probability of being attacked by a
predator by being unpalatable, and the probability thus approach-
es 0 [7] (=so called ‘‘zero asymptote’’, but not necessarily
becoming zero (Jim Mallet, personal communication). This
assumption naturally leads to the conclusion that although the
benefits of mimicry may be greater for the less unpalatable species
[21], mimicry between defended species is mutually beneficial
even if large discrepancies exist between their defense levels [7,9].
This assumption is valid when the co-Mimics have different
population densities, a concept known as the natural history
number-dependent view, because the protection of the co-Mimics
depends on the combination of their unpalatability and abundance
[2,7,21]. In the models challenging the classical view, a Pavlovian
predator is assumed to attack prey with a fixed, non-zero
asymptotic attack probability, after learning during a given time
interval [18,20,23], whose value depends on the level of prey
unpalatability. Referring to several examples in experimental
studies [24–29], Speed [23] suggested that a stable attack number
greater than 0 on a defended prey is rather common. In fact, bird
attacks on apparently defended prey have been documented in
nature [30,31]. However, this assumption of a fixed, non-zero
asymptotic attack probability has been criticized because it
predicts that the number of prey attacked increases in direct
proportion to the population size of the unpalatable prey [7,9,21].
Moreover, an experimental study demonstrated that a higher
density of unpalatable prey reduced the proportion of prey being
attacked [32], although the model predicts it to be fixed. It has also
been argued that a quasi-Batesian relationship [18,20] relies on an
assumption that the attack probability can reach an asymptote at a
value intermediate between 1 and 0 [7,9 cf. 23]; in this case, the
less unpalatable species raises the attack probability on the more
unpalatable species.
We propose here a mimicry model in which the Pavlovian
predator system [18,20] is expanded by including alternative prey
(other than the Model, the Mimic, or co-Mimics) and a predator
that follows optimal foraging strategy (=a Darwinian predator),
because the existence of alternative prey to the aposematic prey
species has a significant effect on mimicry [33–35]. Predator
behavior predicted by this model is consistent with the predictions
of both Batesian–Mu ¨llerian mimicry theory and the theories that
have challenged the classical view, depending on the availability of
alternative prey. The probability of attack on unpalatable prey can
approach 0 because an optimal forager excludes such prey from its
diet when sufficient alternative prey are available. On the other
hand, a non-zero asymptote is possible if alternative prey is rare.
Moreover, a forgetful predator should occasionally attack
unpalatable prey even after the attack probability has reached 0,
with the result that the attack probability is never fixed at zero.
In mimicry studies, it seems reasonable to suppose that predator
psychology should be taken into account because predators are the
main selective agents that drive the evolution of the traits of the
Model/Mimic species and the relationships between them
[18,20,36,37]. In previous models that consider predator behavior
or psychology [18,20], however, individual predators can choose
only between models and mimics. Optimal foraging theory
successfully predicts animal-foraging behavior according to some
simple rules [38,39] whereby individual predators choose their
optimal diet menu. Incorporation of optimal foraging may lead to
novel predictions about the relationships between Models and
Mimics [40–42], but no theoretical framework exists that takes into
account both optimal foraging and predator psychology [18,20].
We developed a simulation model in which a psychologically
based Monte Carlo predator [18,20] behaves according to optimal
foraging theory [38,39], and examined how the introduction of
alternative prey affected Model–Mimic relationships, and whether
these relationships depended on the relative or absolute density of
the Model species.
Methods
The simulation model
Behavior of a Darwinian predator. We constructed a
simulation model describing predator behavior to examine the
effect of incorporating an optimal diet choice strategy into Speed’s
Pavlovian predator model [18,20] on the predicted relationships
between Models and Mimics. This model approximates a predator
that learns the value of a novel, aposematic prey from its foraging
experience within a given locality and season.
The model includes two aposematic prey species: a highly
unpalatable Model and a Mimic that is either palatable (Batesian)
or less unpalatable (Mu ¨llerian). We defined palatability in
accordance with Speed’s predator psychology model [18,20].
We also assumed perfect mimicry; that is, the two species are
identical in appearance. Our model does not address the
evolutionary dynamics of the aposematic traits of the Model and
Mimic. We compared the risk of predation on the Model in the
perfect mimicry condition and the risk in the condition where the
Mimic has so different a color that the predator never generalizes
it with the Model (=the null model), and thus the ‘‘Mimic’’ is only
a part of predator’s daily diet. This comparison allows us to
estimate the maximum load on the Model: the risk of predation on
the Model is expected to be highest when the predator cannot
discriminate these prey. The direction and value of the load drive
the evolution of the Model’s traits. The predator encounters
Models and Mimics according to their respective population
densities and the number of encounters with Model is independent
of the density of Mimic (and vice versa), but the probability of an
encounter leading to an attack is equal for both Models and
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before attacking.
In many previous simulation models, predators repeatedly learn
and forget the value of the prey based on experience, and the
estimated prey value directly determines the motivation of the
predator to attack the prey [18–20]. In our model, the predator
estimates the prey value similarly, but then compares it to the
value of an alternative diet, which is estimated independently of
the aposematic species. If the inclusion of either the Model or
Mimic into the predator’s diet lowers its foraging efficiency, then
the predator chooses not to attack, consistent with an optimal diet
choice strategy [38].
Therefore, the probability of an attack on the aposematic prey
depends on the following three factors: prey palatability, estimated by
feeding experience (learning); time since the last feeding experience
(forgetting); and the availability of alternative prey (decision making).
We modeled each of these factors as shown below.
Learning prey value
We assume that the predator estimates the value of each of the
different prey species according to a simple Pavlovian learning
algorithm [18,43–45]:
En~En{1za Xn{En{1 ðÞ , ð1Þ
where En is the estimated value of a prey item after the predator has
experienced n feeding trials, a (0#a#1) is the learning rate of the
predator, and Xn (0#Xn#1) denotes the actual value of the prey
item the predator encountered at the n
th feeding trial. This
palatability valuable X should reflect fitness value because it is
expected that in most cases preference corresponds to performance
in the long term. As in the predator psychology model [18],
palatable prey values range from 0.5 to 1.0, and unpalatable prey
values from 0 to 0.5, with a neutral palatability of 0.5. The default
value oftheModel(Xmo) was setto 0.2, whilethat oftheMimic(Xmi)
was varied between 0 and 1.0. When the predator attacks a Model,
the value of the Model is substituted for Xn in Exp. 1. Similarly,
when the predator attacks a Mimic, Xmi is substituted for Xn.
Forgetting the prey value
Forgetting can be defined as the reversal of learning over time
[18], in which memories become more difficult to retrieve with
passing time [46–50]. The change in the estimated value of prey
with the Model/Mimic signal caused by forgetting is defined by
the following algorithm (as in [18]):
DE~w Ea{En{1 ðÞ , ð2Þ
where w is the forgetting parameter (default value, 0.02), as in [18].
Ea is the asymptotic value toward which the estimated value of the
prey returns as a result of forgetting. This value was assumed to be
1 in all simulations, but the result is qualitatively insensitive to the
specific value chosen.
Decision making
We assumed that the decision making of predator was affected
by not only the value and abundance of the Models/Mimics but
also those of alternative prey. When the reward value of the
alternative prey is high and this prey is abundant, predators would
likely choose not to include the Model/Mimic in their food menu.
Conversely, when predators gain only a low reward value from
alternative prey, they might be expected to attack the Model/
Mimic. This model takes this decision making process into
account. Predators estimate the value of Model/Mimic prey
according to the results of their feeding trials, learning, and
forgetting. Only when that estimated value is the same as or
exceeds the mean value of the alternative prey species do they
decide to attack the Model/Mimic. The attack probability, Pn,i s
described by the following relations:
Pn~1 En{1§T ðÞ , ð3Þ
Pn~0 En{1vT ðÞ , ð4Þ
where T corresponds to the mean reward per handling time of the
alternative prey, which depends on the value of the left side of the
following inequality from the theory of optimal diet choice [38],
which describes the mean reward per searching and handling
time.
P j{1
i~1
liei
1z
P j{1
i~1
lihi
v
ej
hj
ð5Þ
where e, h, and l denote units of net reward, handling time, and
encountering rate of the prey. In this inequality, an optimally
foraging predator which includes various kinds of prey in its diet in
order of their profitability must decide whether or not to include
the j
th profitable prey in its diet: it should include the j
th profitable
prey if its profitability (the right side of the inequality) exceeds the
mean reward of the first to the (j21)
th profitable prey per
searching and handling time (the left side). The estimated value of
the prey, E, thus corresponds to the expression on the right side of
Exp. 5. We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all prey have the
same handling time (h).
In our model, T is a thus threshold parameter and it was fixed
during each simulation because the predator is expected to
estimate the value of each prey discretely and its main diet is
expected to be the alternative prey. Independent runs were
performed with T values ranging from 0.2 to 1.0. Although T is a
function of both the availability and individual quality of the
alternative prey, for the sake of simplicity, we tentatively assumed
that the value of a highly palatable Mimic was equal to the mean
value of the alternative prey; thus, T was reduced to being a
function of availability of the alternative prey.
In any given time interval, a predator randomly encounters at
most one individual (either the Model or Mimic). For example,
when the density of the Model (Dmo) and that of the Mimic (Dmi)
are 0.2 and 0.3 respectively, a predator encounters the Model
approximately 20% of the time and the Mimic about 30% of the
time, and it does not encounter either about 50% of the time. The
predator attacks the prey according to the probability Pn; after
each attack, the estimated value (E) of the Model/Mimic complex
is renewed (Exp. 1). Subsequently, regardless of attack behavior,
the forgetting rule modifies this value (DE in Exp. 2).
To construct the simulation program, we used Object Pascal
language (see the source code in Supporting Information S1), and
stochastic events (encounters with the Model, Mimic, or no prey;
attacking prey or not) were coded using the pseudorandom
number generator Mersenne Twister [51]. We ran the simulation
for 1000 time intervals for each of 5000 virtual predators under a
variety of conditions. Our preliminary simulations showed that the
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and forgetting before the 1000
th time interval. We defined the
predation risk to the Model as the mean of the proportion of
attacked individuals among all Models that a predator encoun-
tered in each trial of 5000 replications for each set of parameters.
The behaviors of the virtual predators were estimated by Monte
Carlo simulations, similarly to previous studies [18–20].
Predator psychology vs. alternative prey. The effect of
the availability of an alternative diet on the relationships between
the Model and Mimic was the most important target of this study.
The threshold parameter T, indicating the availability of the
alternative diet, was changed from 0.2 to 1.0 in steps of 0.05, and
changed in the predation risk to the Model was observed. We then
ran simulations in which the Model density was fixed at 0.2 and
the Mimic density was varied from 0 to 0.8 in steps of 0.1 to
examine how the Model species was affected when the density of
Mimics increased.
We classified the observed effects of the Mimic on the Model
into four categories (Fig. 1): no harm, quasi-Mu ¨llerian, classical
Batesian–Mu ¨llerian dichotomy, and quasi-Batesian. The criterion
for no harm was that the predation risk to the Model did not
increase even when a highly palatable Mimic coexisted. When the
risk was increased by a highly palatable but decreased by a less
palatable or unpalatable Mimic, the relationship was classified as
quasi-Mu ¨llerian. A classical Batesian–Mu ¨llerian dichotomy was
defined as when the risk to the Model increased as long as the
Mimic was palatable, did not change if the Mimic was neutrally
palatable, and decreased as long as the Mimic was unpalatable.
Lastly, if the risk increased even when the Mimic was moderately
unpalatable, then the relationship was classified as quasi-Batesian
(Fig. 1). For this classification, we should calculate only three levels
of predation risk on the model: riskMO (=the null model), when no
Mimic existed (Dmi=0 in Fig. 1); riskHI, when a highly palatable
(Xmi=0.8) Mimic coexisted at high density (Dmi=0.7); and riskNE,
when a neutrally edible (Xmi=0.5) Mimic coexisted at high density
(Dmi=0.7). The criterion for no harm was riskMO$riskHI. When
riskNE,riskMO,riskHI, the system was classified as quasi-Mu ¨lle-
rian. When the difference between riskMO and riskNE was not
significant, the system was classified as the classical dichotomy.
When riskMO,riskNE, the system was classified as quasi-Batesian.
The risks were statistically compared using the Mann-Whitney U-
test and the difference criterion was the significance level P,0.01.
Because predator psychology is also expected to affect the
relationship between Model and Mimic, we assumed two different
mannersoflearningbythepredator:afixedlearningrate,wherethe
learning rate a was held constant over each feeding trial and
palatability was influenced by only the asymptote of the estimated
value En; and a variable learning rate a, in which the learning rate
depended on prey palatability as well as on the asymptotic level of
avoidance. To apply the latterrule, a in Expression 1 was multiplied
by (0.5+|Xn20.5|). This modification causes the predator to learn
more slowly when it encounters moderately (un)palatable prey than
when it attacks highly (un)palatable prey; that is, the stronger the
stimulus, the quicker the predator learns. Simulations were run with
these two learning manners, and the learning rate of the last prey a
was varied from 0.1 to 1.0 in steps of 0.05.
Figure 1. The four possible Model–Mimic relationships. Each point and error bar represent the mean and standard deviation of the
replications. Blue, green, and red lines denote the Model’s predation risk when a highly palatable Mimic (Xmi=0.8), neutrally edible Mimic (Xmi=0.5),
or highly unpalatable Mimic (Xmi=0.2), respectively, invades. (a) no harm: not even a highly palatable Mimic (Xmi=0.8) increases the risk of predation
on the Model; (b) quasi-Mu ¨llerian: a moderately palatable Mimic (0.5#Xmi,0.8) decreases the predation risk; (c) classical Batesian–Mu ¨llerian
dichotomy: if the Mimic is palatable (Xmi,0.5), it increases the predation risk of the Model, but if the Mimic is unpalatable (Xmi.0.5), it decreases the
predation risk. A neutrally edible Mimic (Xmi=0.5) has no effect on the Model’s predation risk; (d) quasi-Batesian: even a moderately defended Mimic
(Xmi,0.5) increases the predation risk. The negative effect of the Mimic on the Model increases in this order. The other simulation parameters, w, Q
and density of Model (Dmo), were fixed at 0.5, 0.02 and 0.2, respectively. The predator’s decision-making rule was ‘all-or-nothing’. The threshold
parameter T denotes the abundance of the alternative prey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.g001
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so we ran simulations in which w was set at 0 (i.e., no forgetting
over the whole season), as in [2,7].
It has been demonstrated that the decision making of an
optimally foraging predator is not exactly a matter of all or
nothing, as predicted by optimal foraging theory [38] (and
assumed in Exps. 3 and 4), but is probabilistic to some extent
(e.g., [52]). We therefore examined two additional formulations of
the attack probability P, besides that shown in Expression 3:
Pn~ En{1{T ðÞ = 1:0{T ðÞ En{1§T ðÞ ð 6Þ
where P increases linearly with increases in E (provided that E$T)
between T (P=0) and 1.0 (P=1.0), as in Speed’s predator
psychology model [18]; and
Pn~En{1 En{1§T ðÞ ð 7Þ
where the shape of the P function is analogous to a dose-response
[21]. In all formulations, P=0 when En21,T.
Relative vs. absolute density of the Model species. We
also examined whether the predation risk to the Model was
affected by the absolute density of the Model (Dmo) or by the
relative densities of the Model and Mimic (Dmo/Dmi). We ran
simulations with a fixed Dmo/Dmi (1:1) while Dmo varied (0.1–0.5).
Then, we ran simulations in which Dmo was fixed at 0.2 and Dmo/
Dmi was varied from 0.1 to 0.5. For all of these simulations, the
learning rate a and the forgetting parameter wwere set at 0.5 and
0.02, respectively. The predator’s learning rate was fixed, and its
decision making followed the ‘all-or-nothing rule’ (Exps. 3 and 4).
Accordance with predator behavior. The aforementioned
assumptions about predator behavior were chosen so as to be
consistent with laboratory evidence [53], especially when the
predator’s decision making rules were those described by
expressions 6 (linear) and 7 (dose–response-like), in that learning
rates were positively correlated with the mean prey defense level, the
attack probability of each prey approached 0 (the asymptote) when
the prey was sufficiently unpalatable, and the predator excluded a
prey species from its optimal diet irrespective of its true value when its
estimated value dropped below the threshold value (T) representing
the value of alternative prey. Furthermore, after reaching the
asymptotic level, the attack probability initially oscillated around the
curve but in time stabilized at a value just above 0 as a result of
forgetting. At that point, the predator began attacking the prey again,
and learning again to avoid it. At the asymptotic level, the predator
retained its learned aversion to more unpalatable prey for a longer
period of time, and because the estimated value of the prey at the
asymptote was negatively correlated with the mean defense level of
the last prey taken, the period of attack avoidance (when E,T)w a s
positively correlated with the mean level of prey defense. In addition,
the number of prey attacked was negatively correlated with the mean
level of prey defense.
Results
Predator psychology vs. alternative prey
The predator’s learning ability, which is determined by a, had
much less effect than the presence of alternative prey on Model–
Mimic relationships, especially when at a high value of T
(alternative prey are abundant: Fig. 2); the relationship was
determined mainly by the value of the attack threshold (T) rather
than by that of the learning rate (a). When alternative prey whose
mean value is equal to that of a highly palatable Mimic (Xmi=0.8)
are abundant (T$0.8), even the Mimic, which is expected to be
included in the predator’s optimal diet, does not harm the Model
(no harm). When alternative prey are less abundant (0.8.T.0.4),
a moderately palatable Mimic benefits the Model (quasi-
Mu ¨llerian). The classic Batesian–Mu ¨llerian dichotomy emerges
when alternative prey are rare (low T), and the area in which it
emerges is small (Fig. 2). This result reflects the definition of the
classical dichotomy, which makes it inevitable that the relationship
will emerge at a certain point along the palatability spectrum of
the Mimic; that is, the two categories of mimicry should switch
instantaneously across a ‘knife-edge’ [16]. Quasi-Batesian mimicry
emerges only when the availability of alternative prey is very low
(very low T).
The predator’s learning manner, fixed or varied (Fig. 2a and 2b,
respectively), did not qualitatively affect the results, indicating that
the fine details of predator learning had little effect on model
prediction. Interestingly, a small a was beneficial to the Model: the
parameter areas of no harm and quasi-Mu ¨llerian increase slightly.
Figure 2. The effect of the learning rate (a) and rule of the predator learning, and the availability of alternative prey (T), on Model–
Mimic relationships. (a) The predator learns the value of prey at the same rate a (fixed learning rate); (b) the predator learns more readily when it
encounters highly palatable or unpalatable prey (varied learning rate). Black, no harm; gray, quasi-Mu ¨llerian; white, classical dichotomy; and hatched,
quasi-Batesian. Huheey’s rule [13,14] in which only the last experience is remembered can be obtained by setting a equal to 1 following the fixed
learning rule. The decision making rule of the predator is all-or-nothing (Exps. 3 and 4), Xmo=0.2, Dmo=0.2, Q=0.02. Notice that predator’s learning
ability (a) and manner (fixed or varied a) have much less effect on Model-Mimic relationships than availability of alternatives (T).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.g002
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expanded the no harm area, no combinations of learning (fixed or
varied), forgetting (forgetting or no forgetting), and decision
making (‘linear’, Exp. 6, or dose–response, Exp. 7) rules produced
a qualitatively different prediction from the default prediction
shown in Fig. 2 (Supporting Information Fig. S1).
Relative vs. absolute density of the Model
The predation risk was influenced more by the absolute density of
the Model (Dmo) rather than by its density relative to that of the
Mimic(Dmo/Dmi) (Figs. 3a and 3b): that is, the predation risk changed
more when Dmo varied (Fig. 3a) than when Dmo/Dmi varied (Fig. 3b),
because as the density of the Model increased, the predator’s attack
probability (P) decreased, thus prolonging the period of ‘no attack’,
which reduced the frequency with which a Mimic was attacked and
raised the estimated value of the aposematic prey (E).
Discussion
The basic structure of our simulation model is the same as that
of the Monte Carlo predator system, which incorporates
psychologically based rules for learning, memory, and motivation
of predators [18], but because our model includes optimal
foraging, it produces predictions that differ markedly from those
produced by previous models. When alternative prey are
abundant, as might be expected in nature, a Mimic whose value
is the average of that of the predator’s daily diet causes no harm to
its Model; the predator’s attack probability is determined mostly
by the absolute density of the Model, not by its density relative to
that of the Mimic. In the following sections, we discuss the general
applicability of these predictions in the context of resolving several
of the controversies regarding mimicry theory.
Predator psychology vs. alternative prey
It is clear that a predator’s learning ability affects the fitness of
both the predator and the prey. An increase in the predator’s ability
to learn increases its foraging efficiency, which in turn increases or
decreasesthepredationrisktotheprey,dependingonthepredator’s
decisions. It has long been believed that a palatable Mimic harms its
Model by interfering with the predator’s aversion learning, thus
degrading the predator’s ability to estimate the Model’s defense.
Oursimulationsincorporatingoptimalforaging,however,predicted
that predator psychology would have much less effect on the
relationship between Models and Mimics than predicted by the
predator psychologymodel [36](Fig. 2 and Supporting Information
Fig. S1). This counterintuitive prediction may explain why
Huheey’s mathematical model [13,15], despite its extraordinary
simplification of predator psychology, predicted the effect of Mimics
on Models in several experiments with high accuracy [14] (also see
Relative vs. absolute density of the Model). Indeed, in laboratory
experiments, although predators did not behave as Huheey’s
mathematical model predicted, the model correctly predicted the
frequency with which the Models and Mimics are attacked [14].
Mimicry systems are used by prey of predators of many different
taxa, which suggests that mimetic relationships are possible for a
wide variety of predator learning behaviors.
Our model predicted that a quasi-Batesian relationship could
emerge only under very restricted conditions in which the
availability of alternative prey was so low that the predator must
either starve or eat unpalatable prey. This theoretical prediction is
consistent with the predictions of dynamic optimization mathemat-
ical models of state-dependent foraging behavior by predators [40–
42]. Although such conditions may be rare in nature, we interpret
this prediction to agree with the predator psychology model
proposed by Speed [18,20]. Speed et al. [29], in an experiment in
which wild birds were fed artificial prey in winter, demonstrated that
aquasi-Batesianrelationshipcouldhappeninnature:thepresenceof
amoderatelyunpalatableprey(theMimic)raisedtheattackrateona
more unpalatable prey (the Model). We argue that their result was
critically dependent on the experimental setting: the experiment was
conducted in winter when the availability of alternative prey was
generally solowthat even the unpalatable prey was of relatively high
value. In this context, it is noteworthy to refer to the potential
communication between signalers and receivers. For a signal to
work, the receiver must have alternatives [54]; thus, an aposematic
species should co-occur with an abundant palatable species.
Except in the case of a quasi-Batesian relationship, Mu ¨llerian
polymorphism seems to be unstable because classical Mu ¨llerian
mimicry theory predicts selection with a purifying effect, because
an increase in the number of the aposematic prey decreases its risk
of predation [10,11]. Spatial and temporal heterogeneity can,
however, explain mimetic polymorphisms in unpalatable species
under mutualistic Mu ¨llerian mimicry [7,12,55,56]. Even in mutual
Mu ¨llerian relationships, the benefit received by co-Mimics is rarely
symmetrical. As protection depends on a combination of
unpalatability and abundance ([21], Appendix), less-defended
and/or rare species can obtain more benefit by resembling a well-
defended and/or more abundant species. Thus, a local population
of a less-defended species should ‘adverge’ [10,11,57] to the most-
defended and/or most-abundant species in each locality to obtain
maximal benefit [21].
Figure 3. The effect of (a) absolute and (b) relative density of
the Model on its predation risk. Each point and error bar represent
the mean and standard deviation of the replications. Dmi=0.1 (blue), 0.2
(green), 0.3 (orenge), 0.4 (red), or 0.5 (purple). (a) The density of both
the Mimic and the Model is varied between 0.1 and 0.5 while keeping
their ratio constant at 1.0. (b) The density of the Model is held constant
at 0.2, while the density of the Mimic is varied between 0.1 and 0.5.
Xmo=0.2, Xmi=0.8, a=0.5, w=0.02. Notice that the risk of predation on
the Model (and the Mimic) is influenced more by absolute density (Dmo)
than by relative density (Dmo/Dmi) of the Model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.g003
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It has been widely suggested that the probability of attack by a
predator on both a Model and on Batesian Mimics depends on not
only the presence of the Model but also the relative abundance of
Mimics and Models ([8] for a review). Our simulation, however,
predicted that the absolute density of Models, rather than the
relative abundance of Models and Mimics, determined the level of
the protection of both Models and Mimics (Fig. 3).
The main, and seemingly counterintuitive, prediction of our
simulation model is that the Mimic often does not harm the
Model, even if the Mimic is sufficiently palatable to be included in
the predator’s optimal diet. This prediction seems inconsistent
with experimental evidence showing that greater Mimic abun-
dance always raises the attack probability on the Model [14,58–
60]. These experiments, however, adopted a ‘reciprocal frequency
treatment’, called by Turner & Speed [61], in which the
proportions of Models and Mimics were varied but the total
number of prey was kept constant. As a result, an increase in
Mimic availability dictated a decrease in Model availability. Under
similar circumstances, our model predicted the same: a decrease in
absolute density of the Model, rather than in the relative density of
Models to Mimics, raised the attack probability on the Model
(Fig. 4). The same can be said regarding an experiment that
suggested that the less-defended co-Mimic raises the probability of
attack on the well-defended co-Mimic in a quasi-Batesian manner
[53]. To solve the problems that arise from the reciprocal
frequency treatment, it is necessary to examine the effects of the
Mimic on the Model by controlling both the frequency and density
of the two species independently. In fact, a recent experimental
study [62] reported that a palatable Mimic does not raise the
attack probability of bird predators on the Mimic or its Model
when the number of individuals of the Model is held constant and
sufficient alternative prey are provided.
When Mimics invade a population of Models in nature,
constant predation pressure can be realized by enhanced foraging
activity that is exactly proportional to prey density. Although
enhanced foraging activity may sometimes occur owing to
Holling’s numerical and Type I functional (when the density of
the prey is relatively low) responses [63,64] or apparent
competition [65,66], generally we do not expect predation
pressure to increase in proportion to prey abundance. Moreover,
for aposematism to be adaptive, the predator should be a
generalist, but a generalist may not be sensitive to the density of
minor components of its diet. If the Mimic outnumbers its Model,
the predator may switch and begin attacking Mimics, although this
may not often occur in nature.
Moreover, our model can explain experimental evidence that
previous theories could not completely explain. For example,
Lindstro ¨m et al. [32] demonstrated that captive great tits attacked
unpalatable food items more frequently as the ‘population size’ the
unpalatable food items increased, whereas the percentage of prey
attacked decreased. Neither the traditional view (Mu ¨ller’s original
theory [2], extended by Mallet [21]) nor Speed’s predator
psychology model [18,20] predicted the result completely (see
[23]): the former assumes that a fixed number of a prey species is
killed during predator education [7,21], and the latter predicts that
a fixed percentage is killed. In our simulation, the percentage of
prey items attacked (predation risk) decreased as the density of the
Model increased (Fig. 5). However, the effect of the total density of
Model and Mimic on the number of prey items attacked is
predicted to be the opposite (Fig. 5).
General discussion
Our model differs from previous models because it combines
predator psychology and optimal decision making. It thus reveals
two important factors which enable it to resolve discrepancies
between the predictions of previous models and experimental and
real-world observations. Exclusion of alternative prey has been
predicted to play an important role in mimicry systems [33–35],
and it leads predators to attack the possibly aposematic prey, thus
diluting the protection provided by Model and Mimic aposematic
patterns. However, if sufficient alternative prey items are available,
this effect may dramatically decrease, because it is not necessary
for the predators to certify the value of aposematic prey [67]. The
other factor is the tacit assumption of constant predation pressure.
According to the predictions of our simulation, it was the tacit
assumption of constant predation pressure rather than its
extraordinary simplified predator psychology that prevented
Huheey’s mathematical formula [13,15] from predicting Mu ¨lleri-
an mimicry (also see Predator psychology vs. alternative prey). In
Huheey’s model [13,15], the predator’s attack probability on
Figure 4. The result of a reciprocal frequency simulation. Each
point and error bar denote the mean predation risk and its standard
deviation of the replications. The abundance of the Mimic (p) relative to
that of the Model is varied but the total number of prey is kept
constant. Xmo=0.2, Xmi=0.8, T=0.8, a=0.5, w=0.02. Note that, in this
reciprocal frequency treatment, increasing the ‘frequency’ of the Mimic
raises the predation risk of the Model even in the condition in which the
relationship would be no harm in Fig. 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.g004
Figure 5. The result of a density multiplying simulation. The
densities of the Mimic and the Model vary between 0 and 0.5 while
their ratio remains constant (1:1). Each point and error bar represent the
mean and standard deviation of the replications. Red line and green line
denote the mean percentage of prey and the mean number of prey
being attacked, respectively. Xmo=0.2, Xmi=0.8, T=0.8, a=0.5, Q=0.02.
Increasing the density of the Model, the percentage of the prey
attacked decreases while the number of them increases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.g005
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although the model predicted that a Mimic would always raise the
predation risk to the Model.
One controversy regarding the theory of Batesian mimicry
centers around why Models do not simply evolve away from their
Mimics [8]. The usual explanation is that mimicry may be a race
that Models can never win because the relative success of rare
Mimic mutants is much larger than that of Models [8,11,57]. Even
if the Model could readily evolve away from its Mimics, the latter
could evolve toward Models more quickly. In this case, a mimicry
system may be a nonequilibrium coevolutionary race in which
frequencies of aposematic traits of both participants change over
time [68,69]. Note, however, that a wide taxonomic range of
predators show similar innate responses to common aposematic
color patterns [5], suggesting that these aposematic signals have
been rather stable over evolutionary time.
Our simulation suggests that the selection pressure on the
Model to evolve away from palatable Mimics may be much less
than is usually assumed. Mimicry rings, mimetic resemblances that
often involve several species from many different families and
orders [6,10], may comprise one or a few Models that are mostly
protected and abundant in each locality and other less-protected
and rare Mimics (cf., [70,71]). Even in the case of mimicry rings,
our theory predicts that less-protected Mimics benefit Models,
whereas unprotected Mimics simply take full advantage of the
Model without harming it. Contrary to the traditional view (eg.
[10,11,57]), mimicry rings may be evolutionarily stable.
It has been argued that the benefit of Batesian mimicry is
negatively frequency-dependent on the Model/Mimic population
because the presence of Mimics causes the attack rate to be higher
on both species [1,6,10,11]. According to this view, negative
frequency-dependent selection may prevent Mimics from out-
numbering Models [1,6,10,11], and promote polymorphism in
Mimics. In contrast, our model predicted the absence of such
selection pressure only when alternative prey are abundant. While
this prediction of our model may seem inconsistent with the
occurrence of Batesian polymorphism, but such polymorphism
can be explained by factors other than frequency-dependent
predation. For example, polymorphism could still be beneficial as
a bet-hedge because the densities of their Models in a certain
locality should change seasonally, and then the predation pressure
on each signaler may be reversed. Spatial and temporal
heterogeneity also can explain Batesian polymorphisms
[7,12,55,56].
Our model provides a conceptual framework for mimicry that
can explain the predictions of several mathematical models that
were apparently inconsistent with experimental results. The
relationships described by previous theories are predicted by our
model to occur only when the availability of alternative prey is low
(or the value of the Mimic is higher than that of alternative prey).
Batesian Mimics have traditionally been viewed as having a
parasitic relationship with their Models. Our model also suggests
that Batesian mimicry is more often commensalistic than parasitic.
This view may require a reconsideration of the simple Batesian–
Mu ¨llerian dichotomy, along with the recent claim that the selective
mechanisms of Mu ¨llerian mimicry may include the advergence of
less-defended species toward the more-defended one [21]. As
Nicholson [72] suggested, Batesian and Mu ¨llerian mimicry may be
extreme types along a spectrum of deceptive resemblance rather
than two separate phenomena.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Simulation results for 10 combinations of learning
rules (fixed or variable), forgetting rules (forgetting or no-
forgetting), and decision making rules (linear response, dose-
response, or all-or-nothing) (two other combinations are shown in
Fig. 2). (a–e) Fixed and (f–j) variable learning rate. (a, b, f, g)
forgetting (Q=0.02) and (c–e, h–j) no forgetting (Q=0). (c, h)
Linear, (a, d, f, i) dose-response, and (b, e, g, j) all-or-nothing
responses. The color coding is the same as in Fig. 2. Changes in
learning, forgetting and decision making rules, and their
combinations do not effect the general result.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.s001 (0.55 MB EPS)
Supporting Information S1 This archive contains source code
files of the simulation model used in the manuscript by Honma et
al. (2008). For users of MS Windows, please compile hon-
ma2008.dpr with Borland Delphi. About free versions of Delphi,
please refer to the following site. http://cc.codegear.com/free/
delphi For users of ther Operating systems (Linux, FreeBSD,
MacOS/OSX, OS/2), please compile honma2008.pas with Free
Pascal. Free Pascal Compiler is freely downloadable from the
following site. http://www.freepascal.org/ Contents 1. hon-
ma2008.dpr Pascal code file for Borland Delphi (ver.5 or later).
2. honma2008.pas Pascal code file for Free Pascal (ver.2 or later).
3. random.pas/randomfp.pas Pascal unit files coding the Mers-
enne Twister random generator. Random.pas for Delphi and
randomfp.pas for Free Pascal. These source codes is based on that
by H.Yamamoto. http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/,jz6h-ymmt/
download/MTmain.pas 4. params.txt Text file including param-
eters of the simulateion. This file is used in execution of the
compiled binary.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003411.s002 (0.01 MB
DOC)
Acknowledgments
We thank Kenji Fujisaki and Naota Ohsaki of Kyoto University for
encouragement and helpful advice. We also thank Graeme Ruxton,
Shintaro Oku, Mathieu Joron, Jim Mallet, Mike Speed, Andy Gardner and
two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments
that improved earlier drafts of this work. Chris Jiggins and Rufus Johnstone
provided valuable advice on the research.
Author Contributions
Analyzed the data: KiT. Wrote the paper: AH KiT TN. Conceived and
designed the model: AH. Wrote the source code of the computer
simulation: KiT.
References
1. Bates HW (1862) Contributions to an insect fauna of the Amazon valley.
Lepidoptera: Heliconidae. Trans Linn Soc Lond 23: 495–566.
2. Mu ¨ller F (1879) Ituna and Thyridia: A remarkable case of mimicry in butterflies.
Proc Entomol Soc 1879: xx–xxiv.
3. Poulton EB (1909) Mimicry in the butterflies of North America. Ann Entomol
Soc Am 2: 203–242.
4. Fisher RA (1930) The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
5. Wickler W (1968) Mimicry in plants and animals. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson.
6. Endler JA (1991) Interactions between predators and prey. In: Krebs JA,
Davies NB, eds. Behavioural ecology: an evolutionary approach. Oxford:
Blackwell Scientific. pp 169–196.
7. Mallet J, Joron M (1999) Evolution of diversity in warning color and mimicry:
polymorphisms, shifting balance, and speciation. Ann Rev Ecol Syst 30:
201–233.
8. Ruxton GD, Sherratt TN, Speed MP (2004) Avoiding attack: the evolutionary
ecologyofcrypsis,mimicryandaposematism.NewYork:Oxford University Press.
9. Joron M, Mallet JLB (1998) Diversity in mimicry: Paradox or paradigm? Trends
Ecol Evol 13: 461–466.
A Simulation Model of Mimicry
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 October 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e341110. Turner JRG (1984) Mimicry: The palatability spectrum and its consequences.
In: Vane-Wright RI, Ackery PR, eds. The Biology of Butterflies. London:
Academic Press. pp 141–161.
11. Turner JRG (1987) The evolutionary dynamics of Batesian and Mullerian
mimicry: similarities and differences. Ecol Entomol 12: 81–95.
12. Joron M, Wynne IR, Lamas G, Mallet J (2001) Variable selection and the
coexistence of multiple mimetic forms of the butterfly Heliconius numata. Evol Ecol
13: 721–754.
13. Huheey JE (1964) Studies of warning coloration and mimicry. IV. A
mathematical model of model-mimic frequencies. Ecology 45: 185–188.
14. Huheey JE (1988) Mathematical models of mimicry. Am Nat 31: S22–S41.
15. Huheey JE (1976) Studies in warning coloration and mimicry. VII. Evolutionary
consequences of a Batesian–Mu ¨llerian spectrum: a model for Mu ¨llerian
mimicry. Evolution 30: 86–93.
16. Benson WW (1977) On the supposed spectrum between Batesian and Mu ¨llerian
mimicry. Evolution 31: 454–455.
17. Sheppard PM, Turner JRG (1977) The existence of Mu ¨llerian mimicry.
Evolution 31: 452–453.
18. Speed MP (1993) Muellerian mimicry and the psychology of predation. Anim
Behav 45: 571–580.
19. Turner JRG, Kearney EP, Exton LS (1984) Mimicry and the Monte Carlo
predator: the palatability spectrum and the origins of mimicry. Biol J Linn Soc
23: 247–268.
20. Speed MP, Turner JRG (1999) Learning and memory in mimicry: II. Do we
understand the mimicry spectrum? Biol J Linn Soc 67: 281–312.
21. Mallet J (2001) Causes and consequences of a lack of coevolution in Mu ¨llerian
mimicry. Evol Ecol 13: 777–806.
22. Owen ARG, Owen RE (1984) Mathematical paradigms for mimicry-recurrent
sampling. J Theor Biol 109: 217–247.
23. Speed MP (2001) Batesian, quasi-Batesian or Mu ¨llerian mimicry? Theory and
data in mimicry research. Evol Ecol 13: 755–776.
24. Brower JV (1958) Experimental studies of mimicry in some North-American
butterflies. I. The monarch, Danaus plexippus, and Viceroy, Limenitis archippus-
archippus. Evolution 12: 32–47.
25. Alcock J (1970) Punishment levels and response of white-throated sparrows
(Zonotrichia albicollis) to three kinds of artificial models and mimics. Anim Behav
18: 733–739.
26. Platt AP, Coppinger RP, Brower LP (1971) Demonstration of the selective
advantage of mimetic Limenitis butterflies presented to caged avian predators.
Evolution 25: 692–701.
27. Gittleman JL, Harvey PH, Greenwood PJ (1980) The evolution of conspicuous
colouration: some experiments in bad taste. Anim Behav 28: 897–899.
28. Greig-Smith PW (1987) Aversions of starlings and sparrows to unfamiliar,
unexpected or unusual flavours and colours in food. Ethology 74: 155–163.
29. Speed MP, Alderson NJ, Hardman C, Ruxton GD (2000) Testing Mu ¨llerian
mimicry: an experiment with wild birds. Proc R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 267:
725–731.
30. Swynnerton CFM (1915) A brief preliminary statement of a few of the results of
five years’ special testing of the theories of mimicry. Proc Entomol Soc Lond I:
xxxii–xliv.
31. Srygley RB, Kingsolver JG (1998) Red-wing blackbird reproductive behaviour
and the palatability, flight performance, and morphology of temperate pierid
butterflies (Colias, Pieris,a n dPontia). Biol J Linn Soc 64: 41–55.
32. Lindsro ¨m L, Alatalo R, Lyytinen A, Mappes J (2001) Strong antiapostatic
selection against novel rare aposematic prey. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98:
9181–9184.
33. Holling CS (1963) Mimicry and predator behavior. Proc XVI Int Congr Zool
Wash 4: 166–173.
34. Dill LM (1975) Calculated risk-taking by predators as a factor in Batesian
mimicry. Can J Zool 53: 1614–1621.
35. Getty T (1985) Discriminability and the sigmoid functional response: how
optimal foragers could stabilize model-mimic complexes. Am Nat 125(2):
239–256.
36. Speed MP (1999) Robot predators in virtual ecologies: the importance of
memory in mimicry studies. Anim Behav 57: 203–213.
37. Mallet J (2001) Mimicry: An interface between psychology and evolution. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A 98: 8928–8930.
38. Charnov EL (1976) Optimal foraging: attack strategy of a mantid. Am Nat 110:
141–151.
39. Stephens DW, Krebs JR (1986) Foraging Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
40. Kokko H, Mappes J, Lindsro ¨m L (2003) Alternative prey can change model–
mimic dynamics between parasitism and mutualism. Ecol Lett 6: 1068–1076.
41. Sherratt T (2003) State-dependent risk-taking in systems with defended prey.
Oikos 103: 93–100.
42. Sherratt T, Speed MP, Ruxton GD (2004) Natural selection on unpalatable
species imposed by state-dependent foraging behaviour. J Theor Biol 228:
217–226.
43. Bush RR, Mosteller F (1955) Stochastic models for learning. New York: Wiley.
44. Rescorla RA, Wagner AR (1972) A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: variations
in the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In: Black AH,
Prokasy WF, eds. Classical conditioning II: Current research and theory. New
York: Appleton–Century–Crofts. pp 64–99.
45. Pearce JM, Hall G (1980) A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychol Rev 87:
532–552.
46. Spear NE (1971) Forgetting as retrieval failure. In: Honig WK, James PHR, eds.
Animal Memory. San Diego: Academic Press. pp 45–109.
47. Spear NE (1978) The processing of memories: Forgetting and retention.
Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.
48. Bouton ME (1993) Context, time, and memory retrieval in the interference
paradigms of Pavlovian learning. Psychol Bull 114(1): 80–99.
49. Bouton ME (1994) Conditioning, remembering, and forgetting. J Exp Psychol
Anim Behav Proc 20(3): 219–231.
50. Kraemer PJ, Spear NE (1993) Retrieval processes and conditioning. In:
Zentall TR, ed. Animal Cognition: A Tribute to Donald A. Ridley. Hillsdale,
NJ: L. Erlbaum. pp 87–110.
51. Matsumoto M, Nishimura T (1998) Mersenne Twister: A 623-dimensionally
equidistributed uniform pseudorandom number generator. ACM Trans Mod
Comp Simul 8(1): 3–30.
52. Krebs JR, Erichsen JT, Webber MI, Charnov EL (1977) Optimal prey selection
in the great tit, Parus major. Anim Behav 25: 30–38.
53. Skelhorn J, Rowe C (2006) Prey palatability influences predator learning and
memory. Anim Behav 71: 1111–1118.
54. Zahavi A, Zahavi A (1997) The handicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin’s
puzzle. New York: Oxford University Press.
55. Kapan DD (2001) Three-butterfly system provides a field test of Mu ¨llerian
mimicry. Nature 409: 338–340.
56. Joron M, Iwasa Y (2005) The evolution of Mu ¨llerian mimic in a spatially
distributed community. J Theor Biol 237: 87–103.
57. Turner JRG (1995) Mimicry as a model for coevolution. In: Arai R, Kato M,
Doi Y, eds. Biodiversity and evolution. Tokyo: The National Science Museum
Foundation. pp 131–150.
58. Brower JV (1960) Experimental studies of mimicry. IV. The reactions of starlings
to different proportions of models and mimics. Am Nat 94: 271–282.
59. Huheey JE (1980) Studies in warning coloration and mimicry VIII. Further
evidence for a frequency-dependent model of predation. J Herpetol 14(3):
223–230.
60. Avery ML (1985) Application of mimicry theory to bird damage control.
J Wildlife Manag 49: 1116–1121.
61. Turner JRG, Speed MP (1996) Learning and memory in mimicry. I.
Simulations of laboratory experiments. Phil Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
351: 1157–1170.
62. Rowland HM, Ihalainen E, Lindstro ¨m L, Mappes J, Speed MP (2007) Co-
mimics have a mutualistic relationship despite unequal defences. Nature 448:
64–67.
63. Holling CS (1959) The components of predation as revealed by a study of small
mammals predation of the European pine sawfly. Can Ent 91: 292–320.
64. Holling CS (1959) Some characteristics of simple types of predation and
parasitism. Can J Entomol 91: 385–398.
65. Holt RD (1977) Predation, apparent competition and the structure of prey
communities. Theor Popul Biol 12: 197–229.
66. Holt RD (1984) Spatial heterogeneity, indirect interactions, and the coexistence
of prey species. Am Nat 124: 377–406.
67. Dall RX, Johnstone RA (2002) Managing uncertainty: information and
insurance under the risk of starvation. Proc R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 357:
1519–1526.
68. Gavrilets S, Hastings A (1998) Coevolutionary chase in two-species systems with
applications to mimicry. J Theor Biol 191: 415–427.
69. Holmgren NMA, Enquist M (1999) Dynamics of mimicry evolution. Biol J Linn
Soc 66: 145–158.
70. Mallet J, Gilbert LE (1995) Why are there so many mimicry rings? Correlations
between habitat, behaviour and mimicry in Heliconius butterflies. Biol J Linn Soc
55: 159–180.
71. Franks DW, Noble J (2004) Batesian mimics influence mimicry ring evolution.
Proc R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 271: 191–196.
72. Nicholson AJ (1927) A new theory of mimicry in insects. Austr Zoologist 5:
10–104.
A Simulation Model of Mimicry
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 October 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e3411